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Voices from the Deep: What the Pacific Charmer Tragedy
Means for Preventing Fishing Accidents
Roger Boshier1
University of British Columbia, Canada
Abstract: The CFV Pacific Charmer capsized, sank and two men died. Using interviews with survi-
vors, associates of the deceased and rescuers, the author theorizes the incident and charts what needs
to be done to prevent fishboat “accidents.”
Dying to Fish
Despite the collapse of commercial fishing on both
coasts, 300 Canadian fishboats come to grief each
year. Commercial fishing is a dangerous occupation
– one of the worst. As part of the effort to amelio-
rate the situation, the Workers’ Compensation
Board (WCB) now has a major responsibility for
prevention education. However, their operations are
excessively anchored in Functionalist discourse.
Although fishing operations are important, more is
involved in “accidents” and their prevention. Unlike
the continuing fascination with the Swissair disaster
or publicity generated by the loss of five recrea-
tional boaters after Sunny Boy ran over a towline in
Vancouver harbour, a dead fisherman hardly merits
public attention. Dying is “part of the game.”
Hence, according to popular wisdom, particularly in
fishing families, “fishing is dangerous” and acci-
dents “just happen.” There is considerable fatalism
and many consider death to be “part of the job.”
Roxy Stove, a 25 year old female cook died
when Scotia Cape went missing. But, almost with-
out exception, it is men that die. Why? One reason
is that prevention efforts are almost entirely nested
in techno-rational discourse. Numerous manuals are
preoccupied with equipment and exhort fishermen
to check flares and liferafts. They also try to foster
awareness about flotation equipment. Yet almost no
commercial fishermen wear Personal Flotation De-
vices (PFD’s). Most have elaborate “explanations”
for their obduracy. Another problem is the top-
down nature of prevention education. During stud-
ies at the local marine training institute, the author
was told to “stop asking questions.” “Just write
down what I say … it will be on the exam.” Lec-
tures dominate. Many lecturers have never worked
a fishing vessel. Fishermen are largely silent. Their
experience is rendered irrelevant.
It is a pity dead fishermen can’t talk. Their re-
port of what went wrong, or how it might have been
prevented, could improve the content and processes
of prevention education provided by marine insti-
tutes, the WCB, proprietary schools, fishing unions,
owner and gear-type associations, trade organiza-
tions and insurers. Those who narrowly escaped
have valuable perspectives. As well, the meticulous
researcher can arrive at informed judgments about
what happened and, by so doing, shape the content
and process of prevention education. This is among
the reasons that explained the widespread interest in
Sebastian Junger’s rendering of The Perfect Storm.
CFV Pacific Charmer
The Pacific Charmer was a large steel fishboat
normally moored at McMillan Fisheries – under
Vancouver’s Second Narrows bridge. The vessel
was licensed to pack, but not to fish herring. Yet,
the Charmer was entered into a Department of
Fisheries lottery to fish food herring. On December
1, 1997 there were five men aboard as the Charmer
dragged nets in Pylades Channel – just behind Val-
des Island. The skipper was Len Trent,2 a New-
foundlander with 44 years experience. In 1958 he
had witnessed the death of his brother aboard the
Sheila Patricia which caught on fire off Nova Sco-
tia. Also aboard were deckhand Len Bravos (from
Vancouver), Jack Edwards, engineer (from Prince
Edward Island), Max Rock (from Newfoundland)
and a fisheries inspector, Lawrence West (from
Vancouver).
At about 1.15 a.m. on a frosty morning, Decem-
ber 2, 1997, the crew had 80 tonne of herring
aboard and were making a last set. The plan was to
get another nine or ten tonne aboard, anchor for the
night and return to Vancouver in daylight. It was
three weeks to Christmas and everyone looked for-
ward to the money. Compared to other trips into
high seas and mayhem off the west coast of Van-
couver Island, this was easy. Flat seas, plenty of
fish and only twenty miles from Vancouver. The
net was being hauled up the stern ramp at 1.29 a.m.
when the Charmer listed to port. It paused then, as
the net was hauled higher, rolled to starboard and
didn’t come back. Water poured through manholes
open to receive fish. It also cascaded through other
openings on starboard and, entering below-deck
spaces, downflooded the lazarette through a door
into the engine room that had been tied open.
Openings normally secured in heavy seas were
open because of calm weather.
From the wheelhouse Trent yelled “we’re going
over,” Edwards rushed forward to rescue him and to
wrestle (unsuccessfully) with a liferaft on the
wheelhouse roof. Neither Rock or Bravos could
swim but, fearing entanglement, held hands and
jumped into the 5-degree water. Edwards and Trent
followed. The only man wearing flotation was West
who remained on the now upturned hull for as long
as possible and, by so doing, gave himself a “five
minute bonus.” Later, rescuers would find West
clinically dead but cajole him back to life with
“heat-treatment” gear. Rock found West’s sample
pail. Using it as flotation, he made it to shore on
Valdes Island. Edwards grabbed a fish tote and held
on for 1.5 hours and was retrieved by the hover-
craft. After he hit the water Bravos was not seen
again. Trent also made it into the water alive. Al-
though no mayday had been transmitted an Elec-
tronic Position Indicator Radio Beacon (EPIRB)
floated free, alerted satellites and triggered a large
search. The Coast Guard hovercraft from Vancou-
ver airport found three survivors – West clinically
dead in the water, Edwards severely hypothermic in
the water and Rock very cold on the shore at Valdes
Island. As daylight illuminated the scene two bodies
(Bravos and Trent) were found.
Going Ahead
Data
In many respects, the Charmer was typical of other
fishing accidents. For the purpose of this and re-
lated projects (including a television documentary)
the author interviewed survivors, friends and family
in Lawn, Newfoundland (Trent’s home port), fish-
ermen at Macmillan’s, the hovercraft crew involved
in the rescue,3 salvors who retrieved the Charmer
from the seabed, Transportation Safety Board in-
vestigators and others with relevant knowledge. We
interviewed the wives of Len Bravos and Max
Rock. We have 20 hours of videotape, numerous
documents, photographs (e.g. video footage of the
wreck shot from a submarine), the coroners report,
notes from the inquest and Rescue Centre logs.
Purpose
The purpose was to inform prevention education.
This was achieved by building a social cartography
of the Charmer incident. A secondary purpose was
to listen to those rarely consulted -–wives and
families of dead fishermen and, in a modest man-
ner, invert “normal” power relations that shape pre-
vention education.
Theoretical Perspective
Social cartography is the process of mapping theory
and then deploying the map to analyze social phe-
nomena (Paulston, 1996). The Transportation
Safety Board concluded the Charmer rolled over
and two men died because of downflooding and
free surface effect (liquids slopping around in half
full/half empty tanks). But, in our view, these were
the results of the “accident.” The multiple causes of
this accident were in place long before the vessel
left the dock. Some reside in habits, attitudes and
frames of reference (or meaning schemes) Trent ac-
quired as a boy fishing cod traps in Newfoundland.
Others concern predatory capitalism. The virtue of
social cartography is that it forces the accident in-
vestigator or, in this case, the prevention educator,
to consider multiple (not just easy “technical”) pos-
sibilities. A Functionalist analysis constructs the
problem “scientifically” – e.g. fluids below deck.
Supplementing Functionalist analysis with a Hu-
manist, Radical Humanist and Radical Functionalist
(Marxian) analysis, produces different “explana-
tions” and, as such, troubling implications for the
content and processes of prevention education.
Fig. 1 (available at AERC) shows Paulston’s
(1996) mapping of social theory. In this map the
horizontal axis concerns ontology – the essence of
phenomena. People vary in the extent to which they
think there is an objective “reality” external to the
individual. For some, there is a world inhabited by
lawfully interrelated variables. They have a Realist-
Objectivist Orientation and practice scientism (right
side of Fig. 1). For others, reality is a subjective
phenomenon that exists within consciousness. It
exists “in the mind.” Some people thus have an Ide-
alist-Subjectivist Orientation. In extreme forms,
they practice solipsism (left side of Fig. 1). The
women’s movement has been a significant con-
tributor to the popularity of Idealist-Subjectivist
Orientations.
The vertical axis concerns power and self-
interest. Somebody’s interests are served when pre-
vention programs are mounted. At the bottom are
theories that pose no challenge to prevailing inter-
ests. These regard education as benign – a process
of “giving information” or “creating awareness.”
These theories are nested in Equilibrium Orienta-
tions. At the top are theories that challenge power
relations. Hence, Radical Functionalism, in the
context of the Charmer, would be less interested in
individual errors made by Trent than in the political
economy of the fishery, the behaviour of corporate
owners, the role of government and unions. In the
same way Radical Humanists are interested in op-
pressive power relations but more from the view-
point of learner subjectivity. Theories at the top of
the vertical axis represent Transformation Orienta-
tions.
Prevention
Fishing families, fish companies, unions, WCB, in-
surers and rescuers derived no joy from the loss of
Trent and Bravos. Edwards was traumatized and
West gave up fishing. Rock still goes out on large
draggers but has disturbed sleep and suffers. What
can be learned from the Charmer that might help
prevent a reoccurrence? Families want an “expla-
nation.” There is more than one story and each de-
pends on the theoretical proclivities of the person
telling it. As such, there is more than one preven-
tion strategy. In the remainder of the paper, the task
is to theorize the Charmer from four perspectives
and, at the end, point to implications for prevention.
Functionalist Story
This dwells on the material (and observable) “facts”
and deploys “science” to reach conclusions. It fo-
cuses on what happened aboard the vessel and is
not likely to involve analysis that invokes politics or
digs behind “observable facts.” Fluids in fresh wa-
ter, fuel and other tanks had not been moved around
properly and hence there was free surface. After the
first inclining test, new (and heavy) equipment had
been welded in place. Nets and gear were stored on
the wheelhouse roof. Doors were open below decks.
The vessel was vulnerable and, as the last net of
fish was hauled up, the relationship between the
centre of buoyancy and centre of gravity became
unstable. Of the five men aboard only one was
wearing flotation equipment. None carried emer-
gency lights. Several could not swim. The water
was a chilly 5-degrees. A man with normal build
could last a maximum of 1.5 hours in such water.
Several crew were obese and the skipper had heart
disease and diabetes. Two died.
Humanist Story
Humanists are subjectivists in that reality is what it
is construed to be. They are concerned with how the
world appears. Trent, Rock and Edwards all hailed
from eastern Canada where fisheries are characte r-
ized by a boozy fatalism and disdain for flotation
devices. Like Lawn, the place of his childhood,
Trent lived “on the edge” in significant ways. The
relationship with his wife had been overwhelmed
by alcohol, two brothers had perished in marine ac-
cidents and, after 44 years fishing, he’d “seen it
all.” Having previously packed more than 100 tonne
of hake, bringing in 90 to 100 tonne of herring on
calm seas would not be a problem. But herring have
a different density than hake and, because of added
weights and gear up top, and below-deck openings,
the vessel was vulnerable. Trent was only a few
trips away from retirement and had a partner who
expected marriage. He was a notorious but charm-
ing flirt and occupied a lot of space when he entered
a room or fisherman’s pub. Like his boat, he was
the Pacific “charmer.”
In this story, tying back blow deck doors open,
or “forgetting” to have a pre-trip safety meeting
(when liferaft and other procedures are discussed)
was not a functional matter. Within Trent’s frame
of reference, tying doors back or skipping the safety
meeting was normal – part of the culture of the ves-
sel and an extension of life ashore. What was Trent
thinking or what did he mean by forgetting the
safety meeting or not securing the doors? After
having two brothers die why did he go into freezing
water without flotation or a light?
Trent had a major case of the “experienced skip-
per syndrome.” He knew everything. But didn’t
know what he didn’t know. In the end, not under-
standing free surface or the difference between hake
and herring cost him and Bravos their lives. It was
an on-the-water representation of his life on land.
On the surface, he was knowledgeable, bombastic
and confident. But, underneath barely literate and in
constant fear of being unmasked. Even after the
Charmer was launched he couldn’t admit he hated
it.
Courses taught in marine training institutes
would have almost no impact on Trent and, it would
be dangerous and difficult (but not impossible) to
design a process wherein it would be safe for him to
share his experience, vulnerabilities and, worst of
all, admit he didn’t “know everything.” In this story
two men died because of the way Trent interpreted
the world.
Radical Humanist Story
Radical humanists are also interested in human
subjectivity but want to upset extant power relation-
ships. Many employ ideas from Marx to describe
how people carry ideological superstructures that
limit cognition or create “false consciousness”
which inhibits the ability to “see” what’s happen-
ing. Although Edwards had worked on the Charmer
for several years, Trent was the undisputed master.
Bravos had previously skippered his own boat but
was now deckhanding. Rock had come from New-
foundland and, when the boat rolled, did not know
where he was. West – the fisheries inspector – had
landed on the Charmer only two hours earlier, felt
“uneasy” about the boat but didn’t say anything.
Like Rock and the rest, he had no power. Everyone
aboard was familiar with fishing superstitions but,
after the Charmer rolled, there was no time to in-
voke protective rituals of avoidance. Rather, as
West said, it was “every man for himself.”
In this story the following were important. First,
unequal power relations between those aboard.
Secondly, the “flotation devices are for wimps” (or
“you can’t work in them”) discourse promoted by
Trent and widely endorsed by Newfoundland and
many B.C. fishermen. Despite Trent’s skillfulness,
obsession with machinery and affection for new
gadgets, there was a culture of neglect on the vessel
(as represented by doors tied open, nets on the
roof). As well, an embrace of superstitious ritual
(and rationalization when things went wrong). Be-
cause of vastly unequal power relations between
skipper and crew, deckhands had few options.
Radical Functionalist Story
Radical Functionalists share assumptions that but-
tress Functionalism but are committed to the over-
throw of oppressive and disempowering social
structures. If Radical Humanists focus on con-
sciousness and meaning, Radical Functionalists
dwell on structures, modes of domination, depriva-
tion and contradictions within an objective social
world. The political economy of the fishing industry
– its corporations, unions and other parties – are at
the front of this story. Trent owned half the
Charmer, McMillan Fisheries the rest. At the time
of the sinking, Macmillan’s were in receivership
and there was pressure to catch fish. As well, Trent
had inherited the fish-quota of the Arctic Ocean
(also a McMillan boat) which had snagged its net
and returned home early. The Charmer was not li-
censed to fish herring yet was entered into a ballot
to do so. In the days leading up to this tragedy did
corporate owners – safely home in bed while Trent
and the rest were fishing – consider it their duty to
challenge cultural traditions on this vessel?
After the Charmer was built, Trent considered it
unstable. Hence, steel was welded to the keel to
make it stiffer. As well, extensions were put on net
drums. As half-owner of the vessel Macmillan’s
apparently did not consider it their duty to subject it
to a new inclining test. Did anyone look at the lifer-
afts and wonder if they’d deploy when the vessel
was upside down? In much the same way B.C.
Packers sent out Scotia Cape without an EPIRB
and several people perished. In the Radical Func-
tionalist story, predatory capitalism caused the
Charmer “accident.” However, survivors and, in
significant ways, the fishermen’s union, didn’t see
it this way. To them it was mostly a “mystery.”
Safe Harbour
This accident quickly faded from public conscious-
ness but continues to aggravate survivors and fami-
lies of the deceased. The theoretical approach
deployed here, which puts socio-cultural and psy-
chological issues on the table, has vital implications
for other occupations and settings – such as log-
ging, farming, construction and aviation. It also
demonstrates the power of social cartography and
its tendency to embrace pluralistic perspectives and
challenge hegemonic (usually techno-rational) dis-
courses. It reminds prevention educators that, in
fishing, as in other industrial accidents, there’s usu-
ally more involved than equipment and operations.
Regrettably, there is little evidence of material that
lays outside Functionalism and its techno-rational
discourse in the curriculum and processes of marine
training institutes or the WCB. Prevention practi-
tioners are often afraid to step beyond “facts” asso-
ciated with chartwork, electronic devices, collision
regulations and other “technical” matters. The
Charmer points to the following. Prevention pro-
grams entirely nested in techno-rational discourse
will have a minimal impact on safety. A more ho-
listic program that embraces issues arising from
Humanist, Radical Humanist and Radical Function-
alist perspectives will have a greater impact. Inci-
dents like the Charmer, only one of many, demand
a broad program content.
What about prevention-education processes?
Most fishermen hear stories of who did what to
whom. Almost all have had “close calls” and some
read TSB casualty reports. Hence, prevention edu-
cators should rely less on notes in ring binders and
more on the experience of fishermen (particularly
survivors like West, Rock and Edwards). They
should deploy principles of adult education which
place the experience of fishermen in the foreground.
Rather than lecturing from raised platforms, pre-
vention educators should come down to deck level
and use participatory techniques where fishermen
learn from dead comrades and those (like Edwards,
West and Rock) that got away.
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